No one perfect. No one makes the most morally correct decision all the time, or has their hands totally clean in a place like this, and it's bunk to pretend otherwise. Just have to keep trying, is all.
[she just needs a minute because he really did just very convincingly force her to try loving herself a little bit. that soft squishy part of her, the person in formation somewhere underneath, always felt a bit strange and awkward and she wasn't sure she liked it much. it's harder to think that way when she thinks about it being a part of molly.]
I feel sad. [...] I don't regret it, I only...I care about Dimitri, and about Shinobu, and I care about Rupert and even Bradley, and I simply...I wish I was more like the person they thought I was.
Seems like you have an answer then, yeah? Past is the past. It's gone and done with. Only thing to do going forward is try and be that person, even if it's just in little ways.
[ he'll shove his hands into his pockets, half-shrugging. ]
Suppose that's just the only way it can be for me. It will either be alright, or it won't, but I'd like to think it will? So, that's what I've got to believe.
Because I remember it! I don't remember anything about what that guy at the school did, since those aren't mine.
[ memory week sort of pokes some holes in this Cool Theory though. Anyway he sounds incredibly defense about this in a way where someone knows they are standing on a house built on sand. ]
Hmm. I'm not sure I agree with that. I think it is worth explaining that - you are making a novice student's mistake of equating the corpus with the animus - the ghost, the soul, whatever you would like to call it.
You feel that if an action was taken by the corpus, the body, two things are possible. Either it is only you if you remember doing it, or it has all been you. But memory and animus are not identical. The version of me without certain of my memories was different, but I would not call me an entirely different person than, say, who I was on the station. I would not call a version of you with slightly different memories a different person either. But a separate animus in possession of the same body is a different person.
The question is really what that person at the prism was. Was it the same soul with an entirely different set of memories, no overlap whatsoever? Or a different soul entirely? At some point, I believe that distinction becomes philosophical, but that is a considerably different distinction than the one I'd make between you and a different Mollymauk with about two months' divergence in terms of memory.
[ he'll listen to this, doing his best to understand and keep up, but there's a clear way he's holding himself that's showing he's clearly just ... nervous to delve into the topic at all. something that's always been easy to delineate for him suddenly complex and nuanced. ]
Far as I can tell, have been told, I'm just a-- piece of the whole.
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No one perfect. No one makes the most morally correct decision all the time, or has their hands totally clean in a place like this, and it's bunk to pretend otherwise. Just have to keep trying, is all.
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I feel sad. [...] I don't regret it, I only...I care about Dimitri, and about Shinobu, and I care about Rupert and even Bradley, and I simply...I wish I was more like the person they thought I was.
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[ he'll shove his hands into his pockets, half-shrugging. ]
I know who you are.
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Are you alright? What happened was terrible.
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[ memory week sort of pokes some holes in this Cool Theory though. Anyway he sounds incredibly defense about this in a way where someone knows they are standing on a house built on sand. ]
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You feel that if an action was taken by the corpus, the body, two things are possible. Either it is only you if you remember doing it, or it has all been you. But memory and animus are not identical. The version of me without certain of my memories was different, but I would not call me an entirely different person than, say, who I was on the station. I would not call a version of you with slightly different memories a different person either. But a separate animus in possession of the same body is a different person.
The question is really what that person at the prism was. Was it the same soul with an entirely different set of memories, no overlap whatsoever? Or a different soul entirely? At some point, I believe that distinction becomes philosophical, but that is a considerably different distinction than the one I'd make between you and a different Mollymauk with about two months' divergence in terms of memory.
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Far as I can tell, have been told, I'm just a-- piece of the whole.
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And I'm two hundred pieces of soul forged together. It's messy, but...I would like to try to be a person anyway.
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[ squeezing her hand back. ]
To trying, then.
[ ... ]
If I do admit on some level that maybe I'm - if not the same, then a similar person to the other Mollymauk at that school, what's that mean, then?
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